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ABSTRACT 
The international financial and real economy crisis reached Hungary in the autumn of 2008. The crisis 
made the completion of the state budget and the convergence for the year 2009 very difficult and the 
continuation of the program according to the plan because the economic recession spoilt the budget 
After Gyurcsany Fcrcnc's resignation, on 16 April, 2009, the new government was established led by 
Bajnai Gordon. The main task of the Bajnai-government was to carry out the 20 billion Euros credit 
conditions receiving it from the IMF and the EU, so despite of the 6-7% economical reduction of the 
year 2009. which meant that the GDP-proportional budget deficit should stay under 4% in the years of 
2009 and 2010, too. 
The Bajnai-govemment reduced the budget expenditures with 400 billion HUF in 2009, and in 2010 
reduced with 900 billion HUF. and started to rationalize the tax system. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Up to autumn 2008 there had been a hope that the deficit in budget of our country in GDP 
could go under the „magical" 3%, defined by the convergence criterions of Maastricht, by the 
end of the year. However, the economic crisis coming from the USA reached the countries of 
the European Union, among them Hungary, too, in the autumn, 2008. As a result, a situation 
close to the state bankruptcy evolved from the fact that the international - and partly the 
national- moneylender's capital left the country, which was then avoided with the credit line 
of 20 billion EUR granted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Union and 
the World Bank Group. But neither this credit line was able to prevent the significant decrease 
in the exchange rate of HUF and the escape of both international and national private capital 
from the Hungarian economy. International and national indexes of the real economy for the 
year 2009 showed a less advantageous future. The unforeseeable monetary and real economic 
processes made the completion of the Finances and Budget Plan for the year 2009 even more 
difficult. It was clear in the middle of January. 2009 that the national real economy would 
regress with greater measures than what was expected - with 4-5, or even 7%. (The actual 
decline was 6,9% in 2009!) It was due to the prospective performance of our major economic 
partner, Germany. That is why in January, 2009 Gyurcsany Ferenc. the Prime Minister 
proposed to rectify the budget but he did not want to assume the strict requirements of IMF -
e.g. annulment of the old-age pension for the 13th month and the salary of state employees for 
the 13th month - so he resigned. In April, 2009 the parliament elected Bajnai Gordon for 
Prime Minister on the basis of an agreement between MSZP and SZDSZ. 
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2. M A T E R I A L AND M E T H O D 
The objective of this study is to evaluate realization and economic, political impacts 
of government programme propounded by the new Prime Minister. Bajnai Gordon on 19 
April, 2009. This study has the basic presumption, shared by the Bajnai-government and the 
international economic and financial organizations, too, that our country cannot or just 
partially can adopt the traditional budget or monetary means of crisis management -e.g. 
increase of budget expenditure, decrease of the base rate of issuing bank. In 2009, at the time 
of the economic recession of 6,7%, and in 2010, when a very modest (1%) economic growth 
can be expected, the GDP-proportional budget deficit should stay under 4% as it is essential to 
regain the international public confidence as a result of which the interest surcharges of the 
international credits granted to our country can be reduced and the exchange rate of the HUF 
can improve. This way the base rate of issuing bank can be permanently reduced, which leads 
to the reduction of the market real interest rate which is very high now and which increases 
competitive disadvantage of the national enterprises. Without a strict budget policy, Hungary 
could not have obtained the instalments of the credit of 20 billion EUR granted by the 
international financial organizations. These credits have favourable interests even now, in the 
autumn of 2010, comparing to other credits which can be granted by the international 
monetary market. 
The author of this study presumes that the financial problems generated by the recession of the 
real economy cannot shake the country's viable enterprises, the banking system, the state 
budget, the systems of local governments, education, public health and social welfare, since 
without comprehensive reforms rational measures can be taken which can secure the 
functioning of these systems in 2010, as well. 
3. RESULTS 
The programme of the Bajnai-government propounded on 19 April, 2009 reduced the budget 
expenditure with 400 billion Fts in the second half of the year 2009. In 2010 they planned to 
reduce it with 900 billion Fts in order to secure the GDP-proportional budget deficit of 3,8 -
3,9 %, according to the agreement concluded with the IMF and the EU, in 2009 and 2010. 
Main measures (Bajnai, 2009): 
- annulment of the salary of state employees for the 13th month from July, 2009. 
Though it is true that in the first quarter of 2010 the government paid the part due to 
the second half of 2009 
- annulment of the old-age pension for the 13th month, but in case of the lowest 
pensions the possibility of pension correction increased, and pension premium was 
introduced depending on GDP-growth 
- the retirement age gradually increases to the age of 65. Its first impact can be 
experienced from 2014 
sick pay was reduced by 10%, from 2011 child benefit and maternity leave payment 
will be paid for 2 years, instead of the earlier 3 years 
- at the end of April, 2009 the government price support for gas and district heating was 
cancelled, but the VAT of district heating was reduced to 5%. 
73 
Janos Cost. JozscfGal: 
THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACTIVITY OF THE BAJNA1-OOVERNMENT 
the national supplement of local governments, agrarian financial supports of the EU. 
and the government support of the companies of public transport and public media 
were nominally decreased 
- from 1 June, 2009 the VAT of 20%, which anyway increased to 20% from 20% in 
summer of 2006, grew to 25%, with the exception of some products where it was 
reduced to 18% 
- the employer contribution was decreased by 5%: in 2009 to the twice of the minimum 
wage, from 2010 regarding the full income. It reduced the financial burden of the 
sphere of enterprises with 400 billion HUF a year (kormanyozz.hu. 2010) 
from 2010 the total gross wage pays a personal tax of 17% to 5 million HUF / person a 
year. This measure increased the net wage with 5-15% regarding unchanged nominal 
sum in the pay-scale of 150-350.000 HUF a month, 
the tax burden of cafeterias has increased significantly 
certain measures of property tax regarding the real property were considered against 
constitution by the Constitutional Court, so the property tax on real properties were not 
introduced 
Measures of the years 2009 and 2010 on taxes and extras operate at break-even, w hich 
means that the government counterbalanced the fall in incomes coming from taxes and extras 
with reduction of expenditure. 
In summer of 2010 the unemployment rate approached 12%, the number of registered 
unemployed reached half a million, despite of the fact that government programmes to maintain 
and establish workplaces made the survival of more than 100.000 workplaces possible. 
(https://hirkozpont.magyarorszag.hu/hirek/ksh20100428.html) 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
It seems today that measures taken by the Bajnai-govemment were enough in 2009. and will 
be enough in 2010 to survive the crisis. Overstepping of the budget deficit of 3.8% planned by 
the end of 2010 is expected to be 25%, which is 1% of the GDP, that stays behind the limit 
error in this insecure international and national economic situation. What is more, the original 
deficit-target of 3,8% can be realized by the 200 billion HUF coming from the tax on banks 
this year and by blocking a sum of 40-60 billion HUF in the budget expenditure!! Fortunately, 
dark predictions of Bod Peter Akos did not come true according to which this programme 
would be suitable only to exhaust the credit limit given by the IMF (Bod 2009). The Bajnai-
govemment did not even call the last part of the credit limit (around 5 billion EUR). The state 
debt is financed from the international money and stock market again. 
To establish the permanent development it is necessary to employ more: the efficient reform 
of systems of budget, public administration, education, public health and social welfare. 
Bokros Lajos mentions the critical mass of reforms which reinforcing each other increases the 
efficiency of both economy and society. (Bokros, 2009) 
I think the situation is even more complicated since the question is not only how big the 
critical mass of reforms which flies us to the front rank of development is, but if there is a field 
the reform of which can be realized with the available professional knowledge, with a 
relatively small expenditure and with at least the partial support of the political opposition. In 
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my opinion, this field is the rational reduction of administrative burdens on enterprises and 
population. 
In Hungary the rate of administrative burdens on enterprises approaches 7% of the GDP. It is 
about twice as much as the average of developed countries, and is higher with 50-60% than 
the Czech rate, for example. According to the IMF, productivity could grow with 3% and GDP 
with 7% in the EU, if the administrative burdens on enterprises were decreased. (Nemeth. 
2005) Administration takes 2-2,5 as much time here, in Hungary, as in the developed 
countries. This over-bureaucratic system of authorities is one of the main reasons for 
corruption. Multinational companies settling down in Hungary require the direct assistance of 
the government primarily in authorization and other administrative affairs, beside different 
financial advantages. 
The civil sphere, professional organizations and trade unions are especially weak in this field, 
they do not demand reduction of administrative burdens consistently and in an organized way. 
In the years before the political transformation - mainly at time when Nemeth Miklos was the 
Prime Minister- a process of deregulation had been realized. It should be started again and it 
would be necessary to extend it to the regulation of the authorities which has not been touched 
so far, too. In case of reduction of the administrative burdens with 40-50% the expenses of 
enterprises would be decreased with 800-850 billion HUF a year. There would be tremendous 
time to analyse and plan the economic processes for the authorities too in case of well-
considered checking points. The entrepreneurial disposition would improve, the country's skill 
to attract capital would grow not only in case of multinational companies but towards other, 
smaller enterprises, as well. On the bases of reformed administrative tasks it would be easier 
to construct a much more efficient - and in certain elements smaller- system of political-
administrative institutions. The Bajnai-government did not effectuate overall structural 
reforms. - the administrative burdens were reduced in certain fields, but they increased as a 
whole because of the restrictions 
It is very remarkable that the Bajnai-government could decrease the taxes and extras on the 
wages despite the reduction of more than 900 billion HUF in budget income due to the 
economic recession of approximately 7% in 2009. Although, it is true that it was 
communicated with very low efficiency. This rational step improved disposition of 
entrepreneurs and employees and their economic situation in 2010 despite of the fact that 
VAT, other taxes and extras were increased and benefits for the 13th month were cancelled. It 
became possible to depress the base rate of issuing bank under 6%, which was demanded by 
FIDESZ, from February, 2010 thus opening the way for reduction of HUF-based credit 
interest rates and for suppression of the very risky domestic currency credits. 
It can be considered a significant result that the exchange rate of HUF could grow stable 
between 270-280 HUF/EUR despite the reduction of the base rate of issuing bank. Even the 
commercial balance became equilibrate and in spite of the previous expectations around 5 
billion EUR were left from the credit limit of 20 billion EUR till the autumn of 2010. 
The following facts played a great part in the relative success of the Bajnai -government: the 
ideas of the Reform Union (Reformszovetseg) were significantly built in the government 
programme via the Minister of Finance, Oszko Peter (A Reformszovetseg javaslatai 2009) 
thus having a great deal to manage the crisis. Bajnai Gordon himself, as an independent leftist, 
stood primarily as a crisis-managing professional and not a party-politician - this way he 
could reduce the serious political opposition thus making the realization of the programme 
easier. 
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It seems that the Bajnai-govemment almost exhausted the opportunities of the rational tax-
rearrangement possible without economic growth and without introduction of new taxes. 
Probably the bill on property taxation was introduced and passed in the parliament with 
content purposely against the constitution- because of the protest of the opposite and the 
population and the parliamentary elections of 2010. 
In 2006-2008 the restrictive programme of 1600-1800 billion HUF of the Gyurcsany-
government caused more political tension than the one of 1200-1300 billion HUF of the 
Bajnai-govemment because this latter one was considered by the opposite and the population 
as the necessary consequence of the worldwide economic crisis. 
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